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SHOULD A VESSEL BE FAULTED FOR FAILING TO CARRY
RADAR?
At present, no statute or regulation requires vessels to carry radar.
The United States Coast Guard does not anticipate any change in its
regulations to make the carrying of radar mandatory.' The courts have
indicated, however, that in the future vessels may be held liable for damages caused by a failure to have radar aboard despite the absence of
a statute or regulation.2 The purpose of this note is to determine, by
examining the practical aspects of the use of radar in the shipping industry today, whether the courts should hold vessels liable for damage
that could have been prevented by the carrying and proper use of radar.
The OperatingPrinciple of Radar3
Radar (coined from the words RAdio Detection And Ranging)
operates on a principle identical to that of an echo. Intermittent pulses
of a narrow beam of high frequency radio waves are continuously
emitted from a revolving antenna installed upon a radar equipped vessel.
These radio waves are reflected from vessels within the range of the
radar equipment4 and return to the sending vessel, just as sound waves
from a person's voice are reflected from a canyon wall and return to the
speaker's ears. The returning radio waves are digested by the sending
vessel's radar unit, and the contacts (reflecting vessels) are displayed as
"pips" of illumination on the radarscope. The center of the radarscope
represents the vessel upon which the radar unit is installed, and the "pips"
of the contacts are displayed at a position on the circular radarscope
which corresponds to the relative bearing and range of the contact from
the sending vessel.' The information provided by a single radar obser1. Letter from Commander V. J. Mitchell, Chief of the Casualty Review Branch
of the United States Coast Guard, Oct. 1, 1965, on file in the Indiana University Law
Journal office.
2. See Afran Transport Co. v. The Bergechief, 274 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1960);
Farrel Lines, Inc. v. The S/S Birkenstein, 207 F. Supp. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
3. For other easily understandable descriptions of the operation of marine radar,
see Webster, Is Radar an Aid to Safe Navigation, 20 PROCEEDINGS OF THE MERCHANT
MARINE CouNcn. 170 (1963); Afran Transport Co. v. The Bergechief, vepra note 2,
at 473-74. For a more detailed, scientific explanation of marine radar, see WYLIE, THE
USE OF RADAR AT SEA 21-35 (1952).
4. Radar equipment has both a maximum and a minimum range, the distance of
each depending upon the type of equipment being used. Roughly, radar ranges can be
as little as 25 yards or as great as 50 miles. The radar must be adjusted by the radar
operator for use at a desired range within the maximum and minimum ranges.
5. This statement is correct for "relative-motion" radar equipment, but it is not
for "true-motion" sets. The difference between the two types of radar presentations
need not be explained for the purpose of this note. Since most radar-equipped vessels
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vation, then, is an instantaneous indication of present distance and present direction of a contact. 6
The Function of Radar
To understand how the information provided by radar can be helpful to the mariner, it is, of course, necessary to examine the purpose for
which radar equipment is used. The lack of maneuverability of large
vessels demands that evasive action be taken relatively early by vessels
on collision courses in order to avoid a collision.7 When visibility is
good, a visual sighting of another vessel provides a timely and adequate
basis for determining whether evasive action is needed to prevent a collision.' When visibility is poor, however, as in fog, the detection of the
presence of another vessel by a visual sighting or by sound' may not occur
until the vessels are dangerously close."0
Although special rules have been designed to prevent collisions between vessels in poor visibility" (hereinafter referred to only as fog),
these rules only prescribe action to be taken after vessels have detected
each other's presence. As explained earlier, the detection of the presence
of another vessel when navigating in fog may not occur until the vessels
are dangerously dose. It would obviously be desirable to keep vessels
out of these dangerous situations, and that is precisely what the intelligent use of radar can do.
As mentioned earlier, a single radar observationL provides an instantaneous indication of the present distance and present direction of a contact. By making a "plot" of three or more radar observations, the radar
operator can calculate the course and speed of the contact.'2 By comparhave "relative-motion" sets (see Webster, supra note 3, at 171) the statements made
herein will refer to that type of radar presentation, although they will be applicable in
most instances to either type of presentation.
6. U.S. NAVAL OCEANOGRAPHIC OFFICE, RADAR PLOTTINC MANUAL 2 (H.O. Pub.
No. 257, 1964)

(hereinafter cited RADIAR PLOTTING MANUAL).

7. "It is not uncommon for a large fast heavily laden fhip to require 8 minutes
and a distance of over a mile in which to make an emergency stop. The turning circle
of these ships is frequently in excess of one-half mile." Johnsen, The Sinall Boat vs.
The Large Vessel, 18 PROCEEDINGS OF THE MERCHANT MARINL COUNCIL 62 (1961).
8. See OuDET, RADAR AND COLLISlON 11 (1959); RADAR PLOTTING MANUAL, supra
note 6, at 2.
9. The hearing of the fog-horn of another vessel in fog will usually occur before
visual contact is made.
10. RADAR PLOTTING MANUAL, supra note 6, at 3.
11. See note 66 infra.
12. Although the mechanics of plotting are outside the scope of this note, it is
necessary to mention the fact that plotting is considered by mort experts to be absolutely
essential to the proper use of radar as a collision-preventing device. In the past, however, many mariners not trained on the proper use of radar refused to plot either because
they did not care to learn how to make an accurate plot or felt that the making of a plot
took too much time. They simply stared into the radarscope with blind reliance that
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ing the course and speed of his own vessel with the course and speed of
the contact, the operator can determine the closest-point-of-approach
(CPA) of the vessels if present courses and speeds are maintained. If
the CPA is found to be less than a predetermined distance (three miles is
usually considered to be the minimum safe CPA' 3 ), maneuvers should be
taken to increase the CPA. 4 Further radar observations should then be
made to make sure that the maneuvers had the desired effect of increasing the CPA. 5 By maintaining a safe distance between the vessels, the
risk of collision is avoided.'
Thus, radar's function is to prevent fog
collisions by enabling vessels to keep out of what might be called the
"collision zone."' 7
no harm would befall their vessel with this magical device aboard, not realizing that
they could only gain the information needed to safely and intelligently maneuver their
vessels through fog by taking the time to make a plot. This failure to plot has been
blamed for many collisions.
For articles describing the mechanics of plotting and emphasizing the necessity
of making a plot, see WYLIE, op. cit. supra note 3, at 37; RADAR PLOTTING MANUAL,
supra note 6, at 10-15; Healy, Legal Effect of Radar, 14 PROCEEDINGS OF THE MERCHANT
MARINE COUNIcL 3 (1957) ; Thayer, Plot For Safety, 14 PROCEEDINGS OF THE MERCHANT
MARINE CouNcIL 52 (1957) ; Webster, supra note 3, at 171.
The courts also feel that the making of a plot is necessary. See Orient Steam
Navigation Co. v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 469, 474 (S.D. Cal. 1964), and cases cited
therein. Due to the time element involved in plotting (roughly 6-10 minutes) the
making of a plot may not be possible or useful when navigating in crowded harbors or
rivers.
13. "[T]he closet point of approach safety zone, usually 3 miles, sometimes 5
miles, is the master's judgment as to how much clear water he needs to do defensive
driving and avoid other vessels at sea." McGovern, Head to Head With Radar, 14
PROCEEDINGS OF THE MERCHANT MARINE COUNCIL 155, 167 (1957).
14. Of course, care must be taken to insure that a maneuver to avoid a possible
dangerous situation with one vessel does not increase the risk of collision with any
other nearby vessels.
15. If the vessel observed by radar has made a maneuver which counteracts the
observing vessel's maneuver, the risk of collision will still exist. By providing detection
of a contact at such a great range (10 miles, for instance), radar may give the navigator
time to make a second or third evasive maneuver if his first one was ineffective.
OUDET, op. cit. .upra note 8, at 21.
16. Not only is the risk of collision avoided, but less delay is encountered in complying with the Rules of Navigation (see note 62 infra), which, in some instances,
require a vessel to stop her engines upon hearing the fog signal of another vessel (see
note 69 infra).
For an article emphasizing the importance of the use of radar for prevention of
collisions through positive action (keeping vessels out of dangerous situations), see
Slack, A Fresh Look at the Rules of the Road and Radar Navigation, 21 PROCEEDINGS
OF THE MERCHANT MARINE COUNCIL 113 (1964).
17. In RADAR PLOTTING MANUAL, supra note 6, at 3, the collision zone is defined
as the area in which "immediate, drastic action may be needed to avoid collision . . ."
and it is said that because of the time lag in making a radar plot, the radius of the
collision zone in poor visibility should never be less than three miles. [The "collision
zone" is identical to the "closest point of approach safety zone" mentioned in note
13 supra.]
Whenever vessels enter the collision zone, they are in what the International Rules
of Navigation (see note 62 infra) call a "close-quarters" situation (see note 70 infra,
providing for maneuvers based on radar observation to avoid a close-quarters situation).
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Radar in thw Past
Radar became available for use on commercial vessels at the end of
World War 11.18 Many mariners boasted that the use of radar would
mean the end of all fog collisions at sea, for radar was expected to enable
the mariner to "see" in fog as well as he could see in clear weather. 9
However, fog collisions continued to occur, in many cases between vessels both of which were equipped with radar.2" Radar was even blamed
for causing collisions, 2 and a new statistical category of collisions called
"radar assisted" collisions emerged.22 However, a closer look at the
operation of radar will reveal that the expectations oi those who regarded
radar as the ultimate in collision prevention were not disappointed because
of any failure on the part of radar equipment itself to perform as intended. Rather, the public and mariners were "over-sold" on radar; the
expectations that radar would enable mariners to "see through" fog as
well as they could see in clear weather and that it would mean the end of
all fog collisions at sea were ill-founded in their conception in that they
were formed without a true understanding of the role radar plays in collision prevention and without knowledge of certain limitations on the
performance and effectiveness of radar equipment.
Limitations on Radar's Effective;,ess
Radar does not perform perfectly under all conditions; it has inherent weaknesses. When seas are rough, the radio si!-nals emitted from a
vessel's radar antenna may be reflected back to the vessel from the tops
of high waves. Consequently, the "pips" of nearby vessels may be obIn Wylie, Radar and the Ride of the Road, 19 PROCEEDINGS OF THE MERCHANT MARINE

CouNciL 63 (1962), the author says that most mariners would define a close-quarters
situation in fog as a separation of less than two or three miles He then states:
It can be described also as the distanwe at which the data rate of normal marine
radar observation and plotting fails to give warning of Lhanges of movement
by another ship in time to permit safe remedial action. (Emphasis added.)

Of course, preventing fog collisions is not the only function radar serves. It is a
valuable navigational aid, as it can detect bouys and land mr.:sses, thereby helping the
mariner navigate narrow channels and rivers. It is also useful in preventing groundings
and strandings (see note 154 infra and accompanying text).
18. Healy, Radar and the New Collision Regidations, 37 TUL. L. REv. 621 (1963).
19. Webster, supra note 3, at 170.
20. "Indeed, it is surprising how many collisions contfiaue to occur despite the
fact that both vessels are equipped with and are operating r'adar." Afran Transport
Co. v. The Bergechief, 274 F.2d 469, 473 (2d Cir. 1960).
Probably the most famous collision between radar-equipped vessels, and one that
stimulated a great deal of thinking about marine radar, occurrA on July 25, 1956, when
the Andrea Doria and the Stockhohn collided off Nantucket.
21. OUDET, op. cit. supra note 8, at 3.
22. See McGovern, supra note 13, at 155.
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scured by or indistinguishable from the "pips" created by the rough seas.
This is known as "sea clutter."" Similar effects are created by heavy
rains and snows. Wooden vessels make poor reflectors, and consequently
the signal reflected from a small wooden vessel may be so weak that no
"pip" appears on the radarscope.2 4 Thus, in areas frequented by small
wooden vessels, the absence of any "pips" on the radarscope is no guarantee that the surrounding waters are free of other traffic." There are
other situations in which the effectiveness of radar is impaired," but
these will illustrate the fact that radar is not a "magical eye" that works
perfectly under all conditions.
These inherent weaknesses, however, have not been to blame for the
rash of so-called "radar assisted" collisions.2
The real culprit has been
the "human error element.

28

The information supplied by radar falls far short of that supplied
by visual observation.2" Thus, mariners were sadly mistaken in their
belief that radar by itself would assimilate navigation in fog with navigation in clear weather."° Radar can only supply the present distance and
direction of another vessel. The burden of reading this information from
the radarscope, making a plot, and then taking the correct action based on
the information obtained is on those persons operating the radar equip23. WYLIE, op. cit. supra note 3, at 96.
24. Id. at 70.
25. For two collision cases involving small wooden vessels which were not detected
by a larger vessel's radar, see Hawley, Review of Marine Casualties, 18 PROCEEDINGS
OF THE MERCHANT MARINE COUNCIL

224, 225 (1961).

26. See OUDET, op. cit. supra note 8, at 10; WYLIE, op. cit. supra note 3, at 96-111.
27. "All these weaknesses of radar are no doubt important, and one or other of
them may play a sinister part in an encounter at sea. But accidents attributable to a
limitation inherent in radar are in practice somewhat rare; we must look elsewhere
for the causes of some of the more perplexing collisions that have taken place in spite
of radar." OuDET, op. cit. supra note 8, at 11.

28. "Most so-called radar assisted collisions are due to the 'human element.' In
hardly any collision cases has radar equipment itself been found to be seriously at
fault." Letter from C. R. Shanholtzer, Chief Radar Instructor for the Maritime
Administration, Dec. 1, 1965, on file in the Indiana University Law Journal office.
29. OuDE , op. cit. supra note 8, at 11. "It [radar] does not identify the contact
as a ship or even as a moving object, nor does it, in general, directly indicate the course
and speed of another vessel, or its aspect. It gives no reliable information as to the
size and type of the contact. . . . In short, radar is not the equivalent of visual
observation." RADAR PLOTTING MANUAL, supra note 6, at 2.
30. "The use of our eyes is so instinctive that we often fail to realize all they do
for us. It is only when they no longer function, as in thick weather, that the extent of
our loss becomes apparent. Until recent years the only remedy for this temporary
blindness was the audible fog-signal, and no one imagined that hearing was anything
but a most imperfect substitute for sight. Then radar came, and the navigator again
had a sort of vision to assist him. He thought that his sight had come back; and it is
this belief that we must get rid of, for it has been the source of all the subsequent
disappointment." OuDEr, op. cit. supra note 8, at 10.
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ment and directing the vessel's navigation. 3 "It is here that the human
element becomes of importance and human failure can be so disastrous." 2
This human element has proved itself to be the greatest limitation on the
effectiveness of radar, for human failure has been responsible for almost
all so-called "radarassisted" collisions.3"
Radar can only be effective as an anti-collision device when it is
used properly and the information it provides is interpreted and utilized
in the correct manner.34 In order to adjust the set properly and interpret
and utilize the information provided in the correct manner, the navigator
needs both training and experience.3" The presence of radar on board a
vessel may give the unwary navigator a false sense of security, leading
him to take a foolhardy chance in reliance that his radar will somehow
"ward off" any impending disaster.36 Thus, it is imperative that the
navigator be trained in the use of and be well aware of the limitations on
the use of radar equipment.3"
The United States Coast Guard has attempted to overcome much of
the adverse human error element by requiring that as of May 1, 1962,
all deck officers on Coast Guard inspected radar equipped vessels of 300
31. "Radar can detect a vessel which is a potential danger, but it is powerless
when it comes to avoiding it; that is the seaman's business." Id. at 8.
32. Healy, supra note 12, at 3.
33. "In almost every collision case investigated by the U. S. Coast Guard involving
radar one conclusion appears time after time: improper use of the radar or improper
interpretation of the information provided by the radar was a major contribution to the
disaster." (Emphasis added.) Slack, supra note 16, at 113.
34. RADAR PLOTTING MANUAL, supra note 6, at 2; Webster, supra note 3, at 171.
"It will thus be seen that radar equipment is useless as an aid in the avoidance of
collision unless it is skillfully handled and unless the information which it furnishes is
accurately plotted and properly interpreted." Healy, supra note 12, at 3.
35. Webster, supra note 3, at 170. For an explanation of the operational controls
on radar equipment and the adjustments that must be made, Eee WYLM, op. cit. mpra
note 3, at 36-42.
36. Healy, supra note 12, at 3. In Polarus Steamship Co. v. The T/S Sandefjord,
236 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 982 (1957), a collision case involving
a radar-equipped vessel going at an excessive speed in fog, the court made the following
comment at 271:
Indeed, what happened here demonstrates how
used, increase the chances of collision. . . .
it seems not unlikely that the Sandeflord would
had she not been equipped with radar, which,
a false sense of security.

radar may, when not properly
While a matter of conjecture,
have proce,!ded more cautiously
under the circumstances, gave

37. "In the hands of a crew which lacks a full understanding of what it [radar]
will do, and what it will not do, it may be worse than useless. It may actually contribute
to the danger of collision. The radar-assisted collision is not a myth. It has occurred
on more than one occasion when lack of understanding of the limitations of radar has
led to improper action, resuling in collisions which might not have occurred if radar
had not been available." (Emphasis added.) RADAR PLOTTING MANUAL, supra note
6, at 2.
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tons and over must be qualified radar observers." Statistics evidence a
definite downward trend in the number of vessel casualties due to fog
collisions in which the misuse of radar was involved." Although the
causal connection cannot be established with certainty, it is a fair presumption that the mandatory training requirement instigated by the
Coast Guard was an important causal factor in this marked decrease of
so-called "radar assisted" collisions.40
The use of radar cannot be expected to eliminate all fog collisions at
sea. As long as there are daylight collisions in clear weather, it is folly
to think that the use of radar can prevent all collisions in fog. The final
judgment as to the correct action to be taken to avoid a collision must be
made by a human being and is therefore subject to human error, whether
the information upon which the judgment is based comes from a visual
observation or from radar. But the negative influence of radar on the
collision statistics can be halted. As the recent trend in the collision statistics indicates, most of the so-called "radar assisted" collisions can be
avoided by the teaching and subsequent implementation of the proper
techniques of using radar equipment.
38. 46 C.F.R. § 157.20-32(a) (1965). To qualify as a radar observer, a deck
officer must either pass an examination on the proper operation and utilization of
marine radar equipment, 46 C.F.R. § 10.05-46(b) (1963), or successfully complete a
Coast Guard approved course of instruction on the proper use of marine radar, 46
C.F.R. § 10.05-46(d) (1965).
This regulation is a follow-up to a 1959 regulation which required all deck officers
applying for an original license or a raise in grade to qualify as radar observers.
This, of course, left untouched all deck officers already holding a license. The new
regulation closed this gap. (Prior to 1959, there were no regulations pertaining to
radar training.)
The Maritime Administration has made a significant contribution to the training
of radar operators by offering radar courses, the successful completion of which will
entitle a man to be considered a qualified radar observer. The Coast Guard approved
courses of instruction, including three established by the Maritime Administration,
are listed in 46 C.F.R. § 10.05-46(d) (1965).
39. During fiscal year 1963, there were 16 vessel casualties due to fog collisions
reported to the Coast Guard in which radar was a contributory factor to the collision.
During fiscal year 1964 the figure was decreased to 9, and to only 6 during fiscal year
1965. The same downward trend is shown with respect to all types of vessel casualties
in which radar was a contributory factor-from 40 to 21 to 16 in fiscal years 1963-1965.
(46 C.F.R. § 136.05-1 (1963) requires that all vessel casualties involving (1)
property damage over $1,500, (2) damage affecting the seaworthiness or efficiency
of the vessel, (3) stranding or grounding, (4) loss of life, or (5) personal injury
causing incapacitation for over 72 hours be reported to the Coast Guard.)
(Statistics on vessel casualties for fiscal years 1964 and 1965 are published in 22
PROCEEDINGS OF THE MERCHANT MARINE COUNCIL (1965) at 18 and 254 respectively.
Statistics for fiscal year 1963 (unpublished) were sent to the author by the Coast
Guard, and are on file in the Indiana University Law Journal office.)
40. It is also a fair presumption that some of the 6 "radar-assisted" collisions
during fiscal year 1965 involved vessels not covered by the Coast Guard training requirement. Perhaps the apparent success of the training program will be a stimulus for
extending the mandatory training requirements to more vessels than are presently covered.
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New developments in radar equipment 1 and devices to be used in
conjunction with radar equipment42 should further enhance the effectiveness of radar as an anti-collision device. A compvter-radar installation
which automatically plots the courses of up to ten ve3sels at once has been
developed.4" Also, the United States Coast Guard is currently involved
in a four point anti-collision program,4 4 one phase of which-bridge-tobridge radio 4 5-is expected to increase greatly the effectiveness of shipboard radar.4
41. For instance, a true motion "radar with a memory," which automatically plots
the movement of observed vessels, has been developed by Raytheon Company and is
available for commercial use. Also, see note 43 infra.
42. For instance, reflectors can be mounted on small vessels to enable radar to
detect their presence. For a discussion on the use of theEe reflectors, see Lipsey,
Radar Reflectors for Lifeboats, 18 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ME CHANT MARINE COUNCIL
116 (1961). Also, see notes 45-46 infra.
43. The "collision avoidance computer," as it is called, was developed by Goodyear Aircraft Corporation for the Maritime Commission, and has been tested aboard
the Coast Guard Cutter Unimak and on the S.S. Constitution. Its cost, including a
radar set, would be slightly less than $20,000, although there are at present no plans
to manufacture it for commercial use. See Goodyear Aircraft Corporation publication,
A New Marine Collision Avoidaiwe Computer, 1963, and letter from J. M. Menhorn,
Jr., Contract Administrator for Goodyear Aerospace Corporation, Oct. 20, 1965, both
on file in the Indiana University Law Journal office.
44. The four phases of the program are (1) bridge-to-bridge radio (see notes 45-46
infra), (2) harbor advisory radar, (3) shipping traffic lanes, and (4) unification of
the Rules of Navigation (see note 62 infra). For a brief discussion of each phase of the
program, see Foster, Anti-Collision Mleasures Promoted by Coast Guard, 22 PROCEEDINGS OF THE MERCHANT MARINE COUNCIL 75 (1965).
45. As proposed, bridge-to-bridge radio would be a sirgle channel, continuously
monitored radiotelephone system, with communications limited strictly to exchanges
of navigational information between ships. Communications regarding weather conditions, verifications of passing intentions and radar observations, and other navigational
information would be made on a "party-line" basis, so that all vessels within the range
of the equipment (purposely limited to about ten miles) could benefit by the informa-

tion. Schad, Single Channel Bridge to Bridge Radio, 22
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(1965).
Certainly the most attractive feature of bridge-to-bridge radio is that it enables
vessels to communicate directly their intended actions in mee3ting, crossing, and overtaking situations. The present method of communicating intended actions in such
situations is by whistle signals (see note 65 infra). During fiscal years 1963-1965,
misuse or misinterpretation of navigation signals was a contributory factor in 342 of 460
vessel casualties reported to the Coast Guard resulting from collisions while crossing,
meeting, and overtaking. Similarly, out of 88 reported casualties due to fog collisions,
misuse or misinterpretation of navigation signals was a contributory factor in 47.
Bridge-to-bridge radio appears to be a much-needed addition to present methods of
communication between vessels. See Cunningham, What Is Bridge to Bridge VHF?,
22 PROCEEnINGs OF THE: MERCHANT MARINE COUNCIL 87 (1965). (Sources of statistics
and collision reporting requirements are explained in note 39 supra.)
46. "Bridge-to-bridge radio's value to the navigator is widely recognized; in
conjunction with radar in fog, its proven performance is ubelievable. . . . Let us
put the single-channel bridge-to-bridge radiotelephone where it properly belongs, in the
radar, where it will be recognized for what it really is: Radar's sound channel, the
ears of the modern navigator in fair weather or foul !" (Emphasis added.) Ives, BridgeMARINE COUNCIL 80

to-bridge VHF Radio Adds "Audio Faculty" to Radar, 22
MERCHANT MARINE

COUNCIL 82, 86 (1965).
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The Statusof Radar Today
Notwithstanding the limitations on the effectiveness of radar dis6ussed above, radar is recognized as a valuable aid to collision prevention
and safe navigation."' It has been described as a "must in present day
navigation." ' Although exact figures are not available, it is estimated
that a very high percentage of our ocean-going fleet is radar equipped.
The Chief of the Casualty Review Branch of the United States Coast
Guard says that of approximately 1500 large ocean-going vessels inspected and certified by the Coast Guard, which includes our entire oceangoing fleet, "it can be reliably assumed that nearly all . . . are radar
equipped." 9
Many smaller vessels, however, do not carry radar. A sample taken
from Lloyd's Register of Ships"0 of 276 United States registered merchant vessels in the 100-299 gross tonnage category revealed that only
121, or 43%, were radar equipped. Similarly, a sample of 116 vessels
in the 300-499 gross tonnage category disclosed that only 64, or 55%,
carried radar.5" A list of the vessels operating on the Ohio River in the
Louisville, Kentucky, area shows that as of March 1, 1965, 236 out of
577, or 41%, carried radar."
Radar sets can be purchased for as little as $2000,11 with the average
installation for an ocean-going vessel costing about $12,000-14,000. " '
The cost, of course, depends upon the type and quality of the set purchased. When compared to the huge investment represented by a large,
47. See WYLIE, op. cit. supra note 3, at 134; RADAR PLOTTING MANUAL, .supra note
6, at 2; Healy, supra note 18, at 640; Webster, supra note 3; Letters from C. R. Shanholtzer, op. cit. mtpra note 28, and M. E. Kingsbury, Vice President of Wilson Marine
Transit Company, Oct. 25, 1965, on file in Indiana University Law Journal office.
48. Letter from M. E. Kingsbury, op. cit. supra note 47.
49. Letters from Commander V. J. Mitchell, Chief of the Casualty Review Branch
of the United States Coast Guard, Oct. 1 and Nov. 9, 1965, on file in the Indiana
University Law Journal office.
50. The sample was taken from the 1965-1966 Lloyd's Register of Ships.
51. It is not contended that these percentages reflect the exact proportion of radar
equipped and non-radar-equipped vessels in the shipping industry at present. The
sampling method used was not in accord with scientific standards of random sampling,
but was simple and convenient; Lloyd's Register lists vessels alphabetically, so all vessels
with names beginning with the letters A-K were counted in the samples. The percentages
arrived at, however, are sufficiently accurate for the purposes of this note. Since
some of the vessels used have probably been fitted with radar since the information
for the Register was compiled, the percentages are probably a little low.
52. These figures were accurately extracted from a list of vessels operating in
the Louisville, Kentucky, District of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The list
was sent to the author upon request by A. F. Huber, Executive Assistant of the Louisville U. S. Army Engineer District, Dec. 15, 1965, and is on file in the Indiana University Law Journal office.
53. Letter from A. Newell Garden, Publicity Manager for Raytheon Company,
Nov. 16, 1965, on file in the Indiana University Law Journal office.
54. Ibid.
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modern commercial vessel, the cost of radar seems negligible. 5 'The fact
that most large vessels are equipped with radar indicates that the cost of
radar is generally considered well worth the added protection it affords.
The owner of a fleet of small vessels, however, may find it relatively
costly to equip his fleet with radar. 8
The status of radar today may be summed up by saying that radar
is definitely a valuable aid to collision prevention i£ it is used properly.
It is not a magical sort of collision-prevention device; there are limitations on its effectiveness. However, the fact remains that radar is the
best device yet made available for the prevention of collisions in fog."
The question to be considered now is whether a v essel should be held
liable for damages resulting from a failure to carry radar.
Collis'ion Liability-Fault
Collision liability in maritime law is based on fault." Ballentine's
Law Dictionary defines fault to be "an error or defect of judgment or
conduct," stating that the term "is broader than negligence and includes
negligence."0 Like negligence, the concept of fault presupposes a standard of correct action," and this standard in maritime collision cases is
derived from four sources :6
1. The Rules of Navigation6 2 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules)
55. Healy, supra note 18, at 629. The investment in a Great Lakes bulk carrier
designed to carry 25,000 tons may be over $9,000,000. (Letter from Lorenzo O. Browning of Browning Lines, Inc., Dec. 14, 1965, on file in Indiana University Law Journal
office.)
56. Healy, supra note 18, at 629. However, a towboat ,.uch as those in common
use for barge traffic on rivers may cost as much as $500,000-$1,500,000 according to
Jeffboat, Inc., of Jeffersonville, Indiana. (Letter from R. W. Krieger, President
of Jeffboat, Inc., Feb. 16, 1966, on file in Indiana University Law Journal office.) So
radar is certainly within the reach of some small vessel owners.
57. "In . . . [my] . . . opinion it [radar] is the single greatest aid to navigation
since the compass, and has been so recognized by most observers." Reyff, Legal
Consequences of the New Rules of the Road, 18 PROCEEVfNGS OF THE MERCHANT
MAIlNE Couxcl. 31, 32 n. 7 (1961).
58. GamoRE & BLAcK, ADMIRALTY § 7-2 (1957).
59. BA=NTINE, LAw DicrioNARY (2d ed. 1948).
60. GiLmoRE & BLAcK, ADwIRALTY § 7-3 (1957).

61. Ibid.
62. The United States has four sets of Rules governing the navigation of vessels
in various geographical locations:
1. The Western River Rules, 33 U.S.C. §§ 301-56 (1964), covering the Red
River of the North and all rivers emptying into the Gulf of Mexico and
their tributaries.
2. The Great Lakes Rules, 33 U.S.C. §§ 241-95 (1964), covering the Great
Lakes and their connecting and tributary waters as far east as Montreal.
3. The Inland Rules, 33 U.S.C. §§ 151-232 (1964), covering all harbors,
rivers, and other inland waters except those covered by the Western
River Rules and Great Lakes Rules.
4. The International Rules, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1051-94 (1964), covering the high seas.
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2. Other statutes and regulations
3. Local custom
4. The requirements of good seamanship and due care.
A deviation from the standard supplied by any of these sources may be a
fault, and liability will result if the deviation is found to be a contributory
cause of a collision. 3
"More often than not, the finding of 'fault' on the part of a ship in
collision rests on her having violated one of the Rules." 4 It is quite
logical that this should be true, for the Rules are specifically designed to
prevent collisions."
Separate provisions of the Rules govern a vessel's conduct when she
is navigating in fog. 6 Since hearing may often detect the presence of
another vessel before sight when in fog, Rule 157 requires that fog signals be sounded at regular intervals. Rule 16" is the heart of the fog
provisions-it provides the correct maneuvers to be taken to avoid collisions in fog and requires vessels travelling in fog to proceed at a "moderate speed." 9 Rule 16 also provides for the taking of maneuvers based
(The International Rules were recently revised at the 1960 Safety of Life at Sea
Conference in London. The new Rules [cited above] became effective in the United
States on September 1, 1965.)
Since the Coast Guard proposes a unification of the four sets of Rules so that they
will all conform as closely as possible to the International Rules (see note 44 supra),
all future references to the Rules will be to the International Rules.
63. GILMORE & BLACK, ADMAIRALTY § 7-5 (1957).
64. Id. at 399.
65. The Rules require various lighting arrangements and shapes to be carried by
vessels, 77 Stat. 196 (1963), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1062-74 (1964), prescribe the correct
maneuvers to be taken by vessels meeting, crossing, passing, or otherwise navigating
near one another, 77 Stat. 205 (1963), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1078-89 (1964), and establish
navigation signals so that vessels may communicate their intended actions to one another
by whistle blasts, 77 Stat. 207 (1963), 33 U.S.C. § 1090 (1964).
The Rules on
maneuvers are only applicable to vessels in sight of one another, 77 Stat. 205 (1963),
33 U.S.C. § 1078(4) (1964), as are the Rules on navigation signals, 77 Stat. 207
(1963), 33 U.S.C. § 1090(a) (1964).
66. 77 Stat. 203 (1963), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1075-77 (1964). For an analysis of the
legal relationship of radar to these rules, see Healy, Radar and the New Collision
Regulations, 37 TUL. L. REv. 621 (1963); Slack, A Fresh Look at the Rules of the
Road and Radar Navigation, 21 PROCEEDINGS OF THE MERCHANT MARINE COUNCIL 113
(1964).
67. 77 Stat. 203 (1963), 33 U.S.C. § 1076 (1964).
68. 77 Stat. 205 (1963), 33 U.S.C. § 1077 (1964).
69. Sections (a) and (b) of Rule 16 read as follows:
(a) Every vessel, or seaplane when taxi-ing on the water, shall, in fog,
mist, falling snow, heavy rainstorms or any other condition similarly
restricting visibility, go at a moderate speed, having careful regard
to the existing circumstances and conditions.
(b) A power-driven vessel hearing, apparently forward of her beam, the
fog-signal of a vessel the position of which is not ascertained, shall,
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on radar information to avoid a close-quarters situation."0
It is necessary at this point to discuss briefly the requirement that a
vessel navigating in fog shall ". . . go at a moderate speed, having careful regard to the existing circumstances and conditions."'" Various
glosses have been put on this rule by the courts.72 Perhaps the most common interpretation is the sight rule-moderate speed is that speed at
which a vessel will be able to stop in time to avoid a collision after another vessel comes into sight.7
This means that a vessel must travel at
a speed that will allow her to stop in her share of the visibility,"4 even
though the speed would be so slow that the vessel could not maintain her
steerageway. 0 The courts are not in agreement as to which of the various interpretations of the statutory moderate speed requirement should
be applied, and one court has recently attempted to overcome some of the
so far as the circumstances of the case admit, stop her engines, and
then navigate with caution until danger of collision is over.
70.

Section (c) of Rule 16 reads as follows:
(c) A power-driven vessel which detects the presknce of another vessel
forward of her beam before hearing her fog signal or sighting her
visually may take early and substantial action to avoid a close quarters
situation but, if this cannot be avoided, she stall, so far as the circumstances of the case admit, stop her engines in proper time to avoid
collision and then navigate with caution until danger of collision is over.

71. 77 Stat. 205 (1963), 33 U.S.C. § 1077(a) (1964).
72. See Skibs A/S Siljestad v. S/S Mathew Luckenbach, 215 F. Supp. 667, 679
(S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd, 324 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1963), discussing some of the courts'
interpretations of the statutory moderate speed requirement.
73. The Chattahoochee, 173 U.S. 540 (1899) ; The Umbria, 166 U.S. 404 (1897).
"The purpose of the statute, spelled out in the 'sight rule,' is to require generally and
not absolutely that a vessel proceed only at such speed that it can stop before striking
another vessel which comes into the range of its vision." Polarus Steamship Co. v.
The T/S Sandefjord, 236 F.2d 270, 272 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 982 (1957).
74. Standard Oil Co. v. The Wellesley Victory, 127 F. Supp. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
This is further refined by some courts to mean that a vessel must be able to stop in half
the distance of her visibility. See The Silver Palm, 94 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1937), cert.
denied, 304 U.S. 576 (1938); Gulf States Marine & Mining Co. v. Arthur Smith Corp.,
156 F. Supp. 306 (E.D. La. 1957), aff'd, 258 F.2d 449 (5ih Cir. 1958); Cf. United
States v. M/V Wuerttemberg, 219 F. Supp. 211 (F.D.S.C. 1963), 1nodified, 330 F.2d
498 (4th Cir. 1964).
75. See The Sagamore, 247 Fed. 743 (1st Cir. 1917), reviewing the authorities
for the rule that a vessel is entitled to maintain her steerzgeway (in other words, a
vessel is entitled to maintain sufficient speed to enable ter to respond to steering
maneuvers) and the sight rule deciding that the two rules are somewhat inconsistent
in a dense fog but both should be applied so far as is possible.
The trend of recent cases seems to be that the maintenance of steerageway is not an
excuse for exceeding what the courts say is a moderate sj eed. See Afran Transport
Co. v. The Bergechief, 274 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1960); Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co. v.
United States, 224 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1955) ; Avondale Marine Ways, Inc. v. The Crescent
Cities, 184 F. Supp. 773 (E.D. La. 1960), aff'd, 287 F.2d 889 (5th Cir. 1961).
76. Even the courts in the same circuit may not agree on which interpretation
should be applied. See Skibs A/S Siljestad v. S/S Mathex Luckenbach, 215 F. Supp.
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confusion by insisting that what is a moderate speed actually depends upon the peculiar circumstances of each case."
It is a well known fact in the shipping industry that the moderate
speed rule, to put it mildly, is frequently violated." Even the courts
recognize that ".

.

. the rule is more honored in the breach than in the

observance."7 Statistics show that excessive speed is a causal factor in
a great majority of fog collisions.8 "
The Rules do not require vessels to carry radar. Nor do any other
statutes or regulations.8" Therefore, fault for failing to carry radar
could not be predicated upon a deviation from the standard of correct
action supplied by either of these sources.
The third source of the standard of correct action, local custom,
usually deals with particular navigational practices in certain areas.8 2
Local custom may be thought of as a set of "unwritten Rules" designed to
avoid navigational hazards peculiar to certain localities. As such, this
source may be eliminated as a possible basis for faulting vessels for failing to carry radar, for the practice of carrying radar is not confined to
a particular geographical location. The carrying of radar is not occasioned by a navigational hazard peculiar to a certain locality, but by a
navigational hazard common to all navigated waterways-the risk of
collision.
Thus fault for failing to carry radar could only be predicated upon
a deviation from the standard of correct action supplied by the fourth
source, the requirements of good seamanship and due care. Although
local custom can be eliminated as a possible basis upon which to predicate
667, 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd, 324 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1963), discussing the various
interpretations in the Second Circuit.
77. Ibid. "[W]e are content to follow the rule ordained by Congress which in
the final analysis is a relative one and depends on the peculiar circumstances of each
case."
RADAR PLOTTING MANUAL, supra note 6, at 5, lists the following as factors to be
considered in determining moderate speed: (1) maneuvering characteristics of the
vessel, (2) state of the sea, (3) traffic density, (4) probability of encountering small
vessels, (5) amount of maneuvering room, and (6) capabilities of the vessel's radar
and radar operators.
78. See Healy, Legal Effect of Radar, 14 PROCEEDINGS OF THE MERCHANT MAmNE
CouNcm 3, 6 (1957); Miley, Radar-Milestone or Millstone?, U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE
PROCEEDINGS, March 1962, p. 44, 50.

79. Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co. v. United States, 222 F.2d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 1955).
80. Of the 88 vessel casualties due to fog collisions reported to the Coast Guard
during fiscal years 1963-1965, excessive speed was a contributory factor to the casualty
in 59, or 67 per cent of the cases.
(Sources of statistics and reporting requirements are explained in note 39 supra.)
81. The most important of these "other statutes and regulations" are regulations
issued by the Coast Guard which appear in the CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS. See
GILMoRE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 398 n 20 (1957).
82. Id. at 424.
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fault for failing to carry radar, custom (not local) cannot be eliminated.
It is a well established tort principle that non-compliance with custom is
strong evidence of a lack of due care. 3 Custom, therefore, is relevant
to the standard of correct action supplied by the requirements of good
seamanship and due care.
Although actually incorporated into the Rules," the requirement to
use good seamanship and due care is treated as a separate standard of
conduct.8" It is upon a deviation from the standard of good seamanship,
which requires the navigator to use all available means to avoid a collision,"0 that the courts have found vessels at fault for failing to use properly functioning radar equipment at their disposal while navigating in
fog." The courts have also found vessels at fault for failing to make
proper and intelligent use of information gained from radar,88 again
predicating fault upon a deviation from the standard of conduct supplied
by the requirements of good seamanship.
Although the issue has not been faced squarely, one district court
has discussed the question of whether a vessel may be faulted for failing
to keep her radar equipment repaired. 9 It has been suggested that as
83. See Pnossm, TORTS 168-71 (3d ed. 1964).
84. 77 Stat. 208 (1963), 33 U.S.C. § 1091 (1964).
85. Guioam & BLAciz, ADmiRALTY 399 n. 22 (1957).
86. See Orient Steam Navigation Co. v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 469, 474 (S.D.
Cal. 1964); The Hindoo, 74 F. Supp. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1947), aff'd i part sub nom,
United States v. The Australia Star, 172 F.2d 472 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
823 (1949).
87. United States v. M/V Wuerttemberg, 330 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1964), vnodifying,
219 F. Supp. 211 (E.D.S.C. 1963); Afran Transport Co. v. The Bergechief, 274 F.2d
469 (2d Cir. 1960); Orient Steam Navigation Co. v. United States, supra note 86;
The Hindoo, scipra note 86; The Medford, 65 F. Supp. 622 (E.D.N.Y. 1946).
For example of vessels being faulted for failing to use thcir radar in clear weather,
see Placid Oil Co. v. S/S Willowpool, 214 F. Supp. 449 (E.D Tex. 1963); Continental
Oil Co. v. M/S Glenville, 210 F. Supp. 865 (S.D. Tex. 1962). Other courts, however,
have decided that vessels do not have to use their radar in clear weather. See Reading
Co. v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 663 (E.D. Pa. 1961), aff'd, 295 F.2d 40 (3d
Cir. 1961) ; Bruce v. DeBuse Barras Co., 169 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. La. 1958).
88. Polarus Steamship Co. v. The T/S Sandefjord, 236 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1956),
ccrt. denied, 352 U.S. 982 (1957); The Hindoo, 74 F. Supp. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1947),
aff'd in part sub nom, United States v. The Australia Star, 172 F.2d 472 (2d Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 823 (1949); Sldbs A/S Siljestad v. 11athew Luckenbach, 215
F. Supp. 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd, 324 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1963).
89. Petition of United States, 131 F. Supp. 712 (E.D. Va. 1955). At 717, the
court said:
At this point it is well to refer to the Duke's radar. Its use would have avoided
the collision and its unavailableness was due to neglect of repair. There was
ample warning-a day or two-of its disrepair. .

.

. However, as the Duke of

York's excessive speed was the predominant fault leading to the collision, it is
not necessary in this case to pass upon the question of whether or not, in the
absence of statute requiring radar, a lack of diligence in maintaining existing
radar facilities is negligence.
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long as vessels are not at fault for failing to carry radar, they should not
be faulted for failing to make major repairs-a vessel with a defective
radar should be treated the same as a vessel without radar-but should
be faulted for failing to make minor repairs which could be handled by
the crew since the failure to make minor repairs is more closely analogous
to a failure to use properly functioning radar." If vessels are someday
faulted for failing to carry radar, however, failure to repair defective
equipment within a reasonable time will no doubt be a fault."'
Should a Vessel Be Faulted for Failing to Carry Radar?
In two recent cases, the courts have indicated that a vessel may be
held at fault for failing to carry radar.2 In Afran Transport Co. v. The
Bergechief,9 3 two large seagoing vessels were involved in a fog collision.
Although both vessels were equipped with radar, the court went out of its
way to make the following comment:
"Though the question is not before us in this case, as both
ships were equipped with radar, the question arises in limine as
to the duty of a vessel to carry radar. No statute or regulation
requires this. .

.

. Nor have the courts as yet formulated any

rule requiring radar. A District Court has found that the failure of a destroyer to carry navigational radar in 1942 did not
render her unseaworthy. Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co. v.
United States, D.C. Mass. 1950, 88 F. Supp. 158. However,
conditions have changed since the fledgling days of radar in
1942 and the value of Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co. as a precedent today is doubtful. Lurking in the background is T. I.
Hooper, 2 Cir., 1932, 60 F.2d 737, certiorari denied, Eastern
Transportation Co. v. Northern Barge Corp., 1932, 287 U.S.
662, 53 S. Ct. 220, 77 L.Ed. 571, where in 1932, despite the
absence of statutes, regulations or even custom as to radio receiving sets, Judge Learned Hand found a vessel unseaworthy
for lack of one. .

.

. We think this case shows which way the

wind blows and have little doubt that a rule requiring radar,
subject to some limitations and qualifications, will sooner or
later be formulated." 94
90. Healy, Radar and the New Collision Regulations, 37 TUL. L. Rav. 621, 631

(1963).
91. Ibid.
92. See Afran Transport Co. v. The Bergechief, 274 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1960);
Farrel Lines, Inc. v. The S/S Birkenstein, 207 F. Supp. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
93. 274 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1960).

94. Id. at 474.
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In light of the evidence presented earlier regarding the status of radar today,"5 it seems clear that it is now a custom in the shipping industry
for large commercial vessels to carry radar. Non-compliance with this
custom would be strong evidence of a lack of due care, but would not be
conclusive 0 -the custom ". . . must meet the challenge of 'learned
reason,' and be given only the evidentiary weight which the situation deserves." 7 The question, then, is how much weight the custom to carry
radar should be given. In other words, should the courts recognize the
custom for large commercial vessels to carry radar as the applicable
standard of conduct in the shipping industry today?
In order to decide this question, the role that radar plays in today's
shipping industry must be examined. There is no doubt that, in general,
the shipping industry feels that the carrying of radar is an absolute
necessity."5 Why the shipping industry feels this way is the factor that
must be discovered.
As mentioned earlier,"9 special provisions of the Rules are designed
to prevent fog collisions. Interpreting the requirement that a vessel proceed at a "moderate speed" in fog, the courts often say that a vessel must
travel at a speed that will enable her to stop within her share of the visiA rule so vague must be difficult to apply. How accurately
bility.'
can the navigator estimate his visibility? When a schedule must be met,
even the most conscientious navigator is likely to overestimate his visibility to some extent. Consequently, he may be violating the moderate
speed rule even though he has made a good-faith attempt at compliance.
Adherence to the fog Rules may assist a ves3el in getting out of
close-quarters situations without a collision in many (but not all' 01)
cases, but it cannot keep a vessel out of close-quarters situations. This,
radar can do.' 2 The fog Rules are essential to safe navigation, and radar
is not a substitute for them. 3 Nor is the possession of radar an excuse
95. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
PROSSER, TORTS 168-71 (3d ed. 1964).
97. Id. at 170.
98. "It would be impossible to move the amount of tonnage that is moved in an

96.

eight-month season practically trouble free without radar equ pped ships." Letter from

l.E. Kingsbury, op. cit. supra note 47.
99. See notes 67-70 supra and accompanying text.
100. See notes 73-74 supra and accompanying text.

101. In certain instances, slowing down or stopping may be the wrong thing to

do from the standpoint of reducing the risk of collision according to Miley, RadarMilestone or Millstone?, U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, March 1962, p. 44, 50-51;
Slack, A Fresh Look at the Rules of the Road and Radar Nravigation. 21 PROCEEDINGS
113, 115 (1964).
102. See notes 12-17 supra and accompanying text.
103. Radar is little help in getting vessels out of a close quarters situation,
RxuDAI PLOTTING MANUAL, supra note 6, at 3. For this pt rpose, the fog Rules are
invaluable.
OF THE MERCHANT MARINE CouNcI.
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for violating the fog Rules.'
But the intelligent use of radar can enable
vessels to avoid the undesirable close-quarters situations which call for
an application of the fog Rules.
It is obvious that adherence to the moderate speed rule is an essential element to the success of the fog Rules in preventing fog collisions."'
However, as mentioned earlier," 6 the rule requiring vessels to go at a
moderate speed in fog is frequently violated. Assuming that all ships'
captains are not suicidal maniacs with a lust for speed, the frequent violations of the rule suggest its impracticability in the setting of today's
modern shipping industry. The shipping industry must compete with
other modes of transportation for its customers. This means schedules
need to be met, fog or no fog. 7 Although the moderate speed rule is
aimed at promoting safety in navigation, there is a point where the striving for the safest possible rules must give way to commercial expediency.
Herein lies the true value of radar: it can bridge the gap between
the demands of commercial expediency and the presently safety-oriented
moderate speed rule. In the hands of a skillful and well-trained crew,
radar can, in many instances, enable a vessel to travel through fog at a
greater rate of speed without increasing the risk of collision. 8 This it
can do by enabling vessels to stay out of dangerous close-quarters
situations.
Radar can be thought of as just another anti-collision device, a link
in a chain of rules, methods, and machines united for the common purpose of preventing fog collisions at sea. If viewed in this way, radar's
value to the shipping industry can only be measured by the number of
fog collisions it can prevent over and above the number of fog collisions
prevented by the other rules, methods, and machines in the chain. Since
104. "The possession of information obtained from radar does not relieve any
vessel of the obligation of conforming strictly with the rules and, in particular, the
obligations contained in rules 15 and 16." 77 Stat. 203 (1963), 33 U.S.C. § 1075(1)
(1964). Skibs A/S Siljestad v. S/s Mathew Luckenbach, 215 F. Supp. 667, 680
(S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd, 324 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1963).
105. Statistics indicate that excessive speed has been a contributory factor in a
majority of fog collisions. See note 80 supra.
106. See notes 78-80 supra and accompanying text.
107. See McGovern, Head to Head With Radar, 14 PROCEEDINGS OF THE MERCHANT
MARiNE CouNCI 155 (1957). The author suggests that radar has been unjustly blamed
for causing speed violations in fog, the economic pressure of the industry being the
real reason for speeding in fog.
108. "[A] navigator may rely upon his possession of radar, which he uses intelligently, to excuse a speed, in thick fog, which, if he did not possess radar, would be
excessive." OuDEr, RADAR AND COLLISION 9 (1959). "[Plroviding it [radar] is used by a
properly trained competent radar observer there is no reason why it should not prove
to be an aid both to reducing delays and to -safety." (Emphasis added.) Webster,
Is Radar an Aid to Safe Navigation, 20 PROCEEDINGS OF THE MERCHANT MARINE
CouNciL 170, 172 (1963).
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the use of radar cannot eliminate all fog collisions,"0 9 the value of radar
to the shipping industry would only be a decrease of "x" fog collisions
per year.
This analysis, however, fails to evaluate radar in light of the need
of the shipping industry which it so uniquely satisfies: the need for a
safe but speedy passage through fog. The ability of radar to satisfy this
need makes its true value to the shipping industry much greater than a
few avoided collisions a year.
In light of the dependency of the shipping industry on radar to satisfy the need for a safe and speedy passage through fog, the ability of
radar to satisfy this need, and the decrease in the disastrous mis-uses of
radar apparently brought about by proper training, the custom for large
commercial vessels to carry radar should be recognized by the courts as
the applicable standard of conduct with respect to the carrying of radar
in the shipping industry today. The shipping industry has established
the custom as thwir standard of conduct, and the law should also recognize it as such. A custom so valuable and firmly entrenched cannot go
unnoticed by the courts.
A somewhat more difficult problem exists with respect to finding
small commercial vessels at fault for failing to carry radar, for it cannot
truly be said that it is a custom for them to do so. 10 In Farrel Lines,
Inc. v. The Birkenstein"' the court declined to hold an assisting tug at
fault for failing to carry radar because the effectiveness of a radar set
operated in close proximity to the side of a metal ship was shown to be
seriously impaired.
"Hence any obligation to equip the Paidine [the tug] with radar did not attach to her in the role of an assisting tug; if
Moran [the tug company] preferred to avoid the added c6st of
radar for a vessel which was largely engaged in that activity
and take its chances on liability for lack of one when she was
not, that was a choice Moran was free to make.""' 2
As to the tug's liability for failing to carry ra&r in situations where
the radar's usefulness would not be impaired because of the closeness of
a metal ship, the court said:
"If this were a case in which the Pauline on a journey of her
own . . . had damaged another ship or a shore installation,
109.
110.
111.
112.

See p. 528 supra.
See text accompanying notes 50-52 smpra.
207 F. Supp. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
Id. at 510.
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or . . . had lost barges she had in tow, and lack of radar was
proved to have been a cause, she might well be faulted on that
score; such a case would indeed remind [one] of The T. J.
Hooper, in which Judge Hand imposed a standard of conduct
beyond any practice that had become truly general where it was
evident that the practice ought to become so."11
The famous case of The T. J. Hooper,"4 referred to by the courts in
both The Bergechief and The Birksteir, certainly affords ample precedent for faulting small vessels (and large ones) for failing to carry radar even though it is not the custom for them to do so."' But the mere
existence of precedent of this nature is not an argument in favor of applying it. The practical considerations of faulting or not faulting small
vessels for failing to carry radar should be the decisive factors.
The positive side of the question of whether small vessels should be
faulted for failing to carry radar is, of course, that radar, when properly
used, is a valuable aid to collision prevention. It would obviously be desirable, from the standpoint of reducing collisions, to have radar installed on all vessels, large or small." 6 However, the following factors
are pointed out, not as arguments against faulting any small vessels for
failing to carry radar, but as suggestive of the inadvisability of laying
down a blanket rule that all vessels are at fault for not carrying radar.
1. The relatively greater maneuverability of small vessels lessens, somewhat, their need for radar.
2. The cost of purchasing and using even the smallest and least
expensive radar sets may be relatively great to the owner of
113. Ibid.
114. 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932).
115. In The T. J. Hooper, supra note 114, two tugs sailed into a storm at sea
and their barges in tow were lost. Had the tugs been equipped with radio receiving
sets, they would have received storm warnings in ample time to seek shelter (which
is what both tug masters said they would have done if they had heard the warnings).
Judge Learned Hand held the tugboats unseaworthy because they were not equipped
with radio receiving sets, even though they were not required to carry receiving sets and
it was not a custom for them to do so.
As to the lack of custom to carry receiving sets, Judge Hand made the following
comment at 740:
There are, no doubt, cases where courts seem to make the general practice of
the calling the standard of proper diligence. . . . Indeed in most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is never its measure;
a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available
devices. . . . Courts must in the end say what is required; there are precautions
so imperative that even their universal disregard will not excuse their omission.
116. "There seems to be no way in which this device can be exploited to the
maximum until its use becomes general, so that vessels can employ it in the knowledge that others also are being guided by it." GILAaoa & BLACK, ADmALTY 423 (1957).
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a fleet of small vessels, especially if an extra crew member

7
would be needed to operate the radar properly."
3. Some small vessels, such as harbor tugs, may frequently
operate under conditions which seriously impair the usefulness of radar."'

4. Other anti-collision devices and developments, such as
bridge-to-bridge radio and harbor advisory radar, may lessen the need for radar aboard smaller vessels in many situations.
5. Present methods of navigation and collision prevention may
be adequate in many instances.
No hard and fast line can be drawn as to what vessels should and
should not be faulted for failing to carry radar. Since radar's effectiveness depends to such a large extent upon the skill of the persons using
the equipment,"' the 300 ton limit established by the Coast Guard for the
mandatory carrying of qualified radar observers 2 is appealing as a rough
dividing line between large and small vessels. The type of work a vessel
is engaged in or the type of waters she sails may be important factors in
deciding whether she should be faulted for failing to carry radar. Perhaps it is a custom for certain types of smaller vessels to carry radar
even though among small vessels in general no such custom exists.
The question of where to draw the line, and actually the question of
whether any vessels should be required to carry radar, could perhaps be
better answered by Congress or the Coast Guard after a full-scale investigation of the many factors involved. But until one of these bodies acts,
the burden of decision is on the courts.
Radar and Moderate Speed
If the rule that a vessel must travel in fog at a speed that will allow
her to stop in her share of the visibility is impracticable, and the use of
radar can allow a vessel to travel at a greater spec d in fog without increasing the risk of collision, the question arises as to what should a
moderate speed be for a radar equipped vessel. The Annex to the Rules' 2 '
117. In The Birkenstein, at 511, the court said that th,!re was a ".

.

. serious

doubt whether a radar on the . . . [tug] . . . would hav served any really useful
purpose unless another crew member had been on hand to scar, it." The court then went
on to say that they were ".

.

. unwilling to find that an a',sisting tug must not only

have a radar but an extra crew member to man it as well."
118. The Birkenstein is a good example of just such a situation.
119. See note 34 supra.
120. See note 38 supra.
121. 77 Stat. 209 (1963), 33 U.S.C. § 1094 (1964).
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comes to a conclusion that the courts had previously reached, 22 that information obtained from the use of radar is a circumstance to be considered in determining what is a moderate speed. 22 The natural inference is that the presence of information obtained from radar may justify
greater speed in fog.'24
However, it is difficult to see how information obtained from radar
can have any effect on moderate speed as long as the courts apply their
interpretive glosses (such as the rule that a vessel must be able to stop in
iher share of the visibility) to the statutory requirement 25 that a vessel
proceed at a speed that is moderate under the existing circumstances and
conditions. If the test of moderate speed is whether or not a vessel
could stop within her share of the visibility, radar cannot have any effect
on moderate speed for it can alter neither a vessel's visibility nor her
stopping distance. Thus, to give effect to information obtained from
radar on the moderate speed issue, the courts must abandon the interpretive glosses they have put on the moderate speed requirement, and
moderate speed must be decided upon the circumstances peculiar to each
case.
In cases where the moderate speed of a radar equipped vessel has
been in issue, the courts have continued to apply their interpretive glosses
122. See Skibs A/S Siljestad v. S/S Mathew Luckenbach, 215 F. Supp. 667, 680
(S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd, 324 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1963).
123. 77 Stat. 209 (1963), 33 U.S.C. § 1094(2) (1964) (section 2 of the Annex)
reads as follows:
A vessel navigating with the aid of radar in restricted visibility must, in
compliance with section 1077(a) of this title, go at a moderate speed. Information obtained from the use of radar is one of the circumstances to be
taken into account when determining moderate speed. In this regard it must
be recognized that small vessels, small icebergs and similar floating objects
may not be detected by radar. Radar indications of one or more vessels in
the vicinity may mean that "moderate speed" should be slower than a mariner
without radar might consider moderate in the circumstances.
124. See Reyff, Legal Consequences of the New Rules of the Road, 18
OF THE MERCHANT MAINS COUNCIL

PROCEEDINGS

31 (1961), where the author suggests that the

third sentence of section (2) of the Annex, warning that moderate speed for a radar
equipped vessel may in some instances be less than moderate speed for a vessel without
radar, precludes the idea that possession of information from radar could justify

greater speed. But see Wylie, Radar and the Rule of the Road, 19

PROCEEDINGS OF THE

63 (1962), where the author, one of the drafters of the
Annex, replies to Reyff's contention as follows:
MERCHANT MARINE CouNcIL

If this item [the second sentence of section (2) of the Annex] was not intended
to imply that radar should have some effect on the choice of moderate speed
it would hardly have been included; so it is fair to assume that either increases
or decreases or both were envisaged.
125. See note 69 supra.
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on moderate speed. 2 ' However, it is difficult to draw any conclusion
as to the courts' position on radar and moderate speed, for in the decided
cases the radar equipped vessels whose speeds were in issue failed to
extract the information needed for effective collision avoidance from
their radar equipment.127
It has been charged that the courts will not allow vessels to travel
at a greater speed in fog on the basis of radar information." 8 The frequent and disastrous misuses of radar in the past have no doubt forced
the courts to take a cautious approach to the use oE radar. 2 ' However,
the recent decrease in radar-assisted collisions 30 indicates that the reason
for extra caution is no longer as compelling as it was previously. Radar
is being misused less often and is hopefully being used effectively more
often.'
An extra-cautious attitude towards radar on the part of the
courts may no longer be warranted.
Radar cannot, of course, enable a vessel to travel faster and safely in
fog in all situations. In and around harbors and other crowded waters and
in areas frequented by small craft that may go undetected by radar, any
speed greater than that now allowed in fog may be unsafe and therefore
126. See Afran Transport Co. v. The Bergechief, 274 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1960);
United States v. M/V Wuerttemberg, 219 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), mnodified,
330 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1964); Avondale Marine Ways, Inc. v. The Crescent Cities,
184 F. Supp. 773 (E.D. La. 1960). But see, Sldbs A/S Siljestad v. S/S Mathew Luckenbach, 215 F. Supp. 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd, 324 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1963),
deciding that moderate speed depends upon the circumstances peculiar to each case.
127. The Annex's recommendation is that infornation obtained from the use of
radar (not the mere possession of radar) is a circumstance to be considered in determining moderate speed.
128. See Miley, supra note 101.
129. For a harsh but interesting criticism of the present judicial attitude towards
radar, see Miley, supra note 101. At 9, the author charges that ". . . the nature of the
court is such as to preclude any interest in the progress of shipping. . .

."

It is

submitted that this charge is not true. The present attitude of the courts with respect
to radar as a speed factor may be safety-oriented, without arny apparent concern for the
practical needs of the shipping industry. But this attitude must have been instilled in
the courts by the shipping industry's widespread nisusie of radar. As the effectiveness
of radar is increased by the training of the persons using the equipment, and
disastrous mnisuses of radar are consequently decreased, the attitude of the court towards
radar as a speed factor is subject to change. The nature of the court, rather than
precluding any interest in the shipping industry, is such that the court is constantly
striving for a balance between safety and expediency in the interest of the shipping
industry.
130. See note 39 supra.
131. The results of a British study made in the English Channel and North Sea
to determine the effect of radar on collision incidence appear in Wylie & Deacon,
Effect of Radar on Collision Incideitce, Lloyd's List & Shipping Gazette, Nov. 19, 1965.
The study showed that ".

.

. despite the increase in total ships and in radar fittings

and, curiously enough, a steady increase in fog days since 1960, the total number of
ships in 'radar involved' collisions has begun to fall off, while the number of collisions
per fog day has been decreasing since 1960."
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immoderate."' But in open waters not frequented by small craft, the intelligent use of radar can enable a vessel to travel safely through fog at
speeds greater than those now called "moderate" by the courts.1 3 3

It is

time for the courts to recognize the true role radar plays in the shipping
industry today3 4 and apply the recommendation of the Annex, that information obtained from the use of radar should be a circumstance in
determining moderate speed, with the demands of commercial expediency
in mind.
The Effects of Faulting a Vessel for Failing to Carry Radar
Before looking at the effects of faulting a vessel for failing to carry
radar, it is necessary to examine two of the rules of liability in admiralty
law. First, damages under admiralty law in the United States are not
apportioned on a comparative negligence theory..2 as they are in most
other nations.'
If only one vessel in a collision is at fault, that vessel is
liable for all of the damages resulting from the collision. 3 1 If both of
the vessels in a collision are at fault, each vessel is liable for one-half of
the damages, 1 8 regardless of the "degree" of fault of each vessel."3 9
Second, the owner of a vessel involved in a collision may limit his liability
under the Limitation Act 4 to the value of his interest in the vessel after
the collision plus the vessel's pending freight if the act or thing causing
the collision was committed or happened without the "privity or knowl132. See OuDnr, op- cit. supra note 108, at 24, where the author describes the
"critical circumstances" which necessitate a slow speed.
133. Id. at 24-25, where the author describes the "favourable circumstances" in
justifying greater speed by the use of radar.
134. "Until very recently the tendency has been to cast the major part of the
blame in collisions where radar is involved on excessive speed and to mention in passing
proper use of radar might have caused the vessels to reduce speed. This has failed in its
purpose of reducing collisions by enforcing reduction in speed. Indeed, the new ships
are being constructed to run at faster speeds, many of them are being equipped with two
radars, and they are running in fog at greater speeds than ever.
"The aiser, then, is to encourage the positive use of radar to keep away from
other ships." (Emphasis added.) Slack, supra note 101, at 116.
135. GiLMoRE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY § 7-4 (1957).
136. See Hearings Before the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Sub-Commnittee
of the Senate Commerce Committee, 88th Congress, 1st Sess., ser. 22, at 6 (1963).
137. Gnm oPo & BLACK, ADmIRALTY § 7-4 (1957).
138. Ibid.
139. The so-called "major-minor fault" rule is sometimes used to mitigate the
harshness of the equally divided damages rule by exonerating the comparitively innocent
vessel from liability in collision cases where one vessel was at fault in only a technical
or "minor" sense while the other vessel was grossly negligent. See Gi.moRn & BLACK,
ADmIRALTY 402-04 (1957) for a discussion of the operation of this rule.
140. Rxv. STAT. §§ 4281-89 (1875), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-88 (1964).
The section applicable to limiting liability for collisions is REv. STAT. § 4283 (1875),
46 U.S.C. § 183(a) (1964). Note, however, that 49 Stat. 960 (1935), as amended, 46
U.S.C. § 183(b)-(f) (1964) places special restrictions on the owner's ability to limit
his liability with respect to loss of life and personal injury claims.
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edge"'' of the owner.
With these rules in mind, the effects of faulting a vessel for failing
to carry radar can be briefly stated. If the vessel had no fault other
than her failure to carry radar, she would become liable for all or one-half
the damages resulting from the collision, depending on whether the other
vessel involved was also at fault. If the vessel wcre faulted for some
reason other than her failure to carry radar, then the finding of an additional fault for failing to carry radar would have no effect on the issue
of her liability. However, it undoubtedly could have an effect on the
amount of her liability. It seems quite certain that a fault for failing to
carry radar would be found to have been committed with the owner's
"knowledge" as that term is used in the Limitation Act, and consequently the owner would not be entitled to limit his 1 ability under the act.
Radar and Seaworthiness
A question which requires a brief discussion at this point is whether
a vessel without radar may be held to be unseawortlby.
Totally divorced from concepts of fault and ne:gligence, the doctrine
of seaworthiness is a species of liability without fault. 4 2 The owner of
a vessel has an absolute and non-delegable duty to furnish his crew with
a seaworthy vessel,' 4 ' and he is liable for any damage proximately caused
by a breach of that duty. 4 ' Before the passage of the Carriage of Goods
By Sea Act (COGSA),"' the vessel owner also owed this same absolute
and non-delegable duty to furnish a seaworthy vessel to the owners of
cargo being carried on the vessel." COGSA, however, changed the vessel owner's duty with respect to cargo to a duty to -use "due diligence" to
furnish a seaworthy vessel. 4 7
141. Knowledge is not limited to what the owner actually knows, but includes what
he is charged with finding out. Great Atlantic & Pacific 'lea Co. v. Brasileiro, 159
F.2d 661, 665 (2d Cir. 1947). There seems to be no doubt that the fact that a vessel
was not carrying radar would be within the owner's knowledge as used in the statute.
142. See Mascuilli v. United States, 241 F. Supp. 354, 363 (FD. Pa. 1965);
GILToM-- & BLACK, ADtIRALTY § 7-2 (1957).
143. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sierackd, 328 U.S. 85 (1946); Ballwanz v. Isthmian
Lines, Inc., 319 F.2d 457, 462 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 970 (1964).
144. The burden of proving the unseaworthiness of the 1essel and establishing the
causal connection between the unseaworthy condition and the injury is upon the injured
party. Goodrich v. Cargo Ships & Tankers, Inc., 241 F. Supp. 332, 334 (E.D. La. 1965).
145. 49 Stat. 1207 (1936), 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (1964).
146. See The Southwark, 191 U.S. 1 (1903) ; The Caledonia, 157 U.S. 124 (1895).
147. 49 Stat. 1208 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1303(1) (1964). The cases governed by
COGSA are defined in 49 Stat. 1207 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1300 (1964) and 49 Stat. 1212
(1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1312 (1964). For an explanation of how the same result is reached
(i.e., the vessel owner's duty is one to use due diligence to flirnish a seaworthy vessel
rather than being an absolute and non-delegable duty) in cases not governed by COGSA,

see Gmiioma &

BLAcK, ADMIRALTY

130 (1957).
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There are three general requirements which a vessel must meet to be
seaworthy;1. the vessel must be:

1) staunch and strong;'
2) fitted with proper equipment in good order;... and
3) manned by a competent and sufficient complement of crew
and officers. 5 '
Since the content of these general requirements depends upon the voyage
contemplated, the minimum standards differ from case to case." 2 The
fact that a vessel is seaworthy for a trip down the Ohio River does not
mean that she is also seaworthy for a voyage across the Atlantic Ocean.
A claim that a vessel without radar is unseaworthy might arise frequently in cases involving grounding and stranding.' s There seems to
be no question that radar is a valuable aid in preventing groundings and
strandings."' The claim that a vessel without radar is unseaworthy was
rejected in a fairly recent stranding case, 5 the court saying that the
carrying of radar had not yet become so generally accepted in the shipping
industry and was not so essential to navigation that a vessel should be
However, the
held unseaworthy for failing to have radar aboard.'
court admitted that the standard of seaworthiness changes with scientific advances and that some day a vessel may be unseaworthy if she is
not carrying radar. 5 ' In light of the increasing dependability of radar,
brought about mainly by the training of radar operators, it seems that
the day must be here when at least large ocean-going vessels should be
held to be unseaworthy if they are not carrying radar.
148.

GILMrORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY

58 (1957).

149. States Steamship Co. v. United States, 259 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 933 (1959) (weak hull).
150. The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662
(1932) (failure to carry radio receiving set). This, of course, is the requirement
under which the argument would be made that a vessel without radar is unseaworthy.
151. Admiral Towing Co. v. Woolen, 290 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1961) (inadequate
and incompetent crew). An incompetent radar operator might well render a vessel
unseaworthy under this requirement.
152. GILMORE & BLACK, ADmRLTY 58 (1957). The usual statement is that the
vessel and appurtenances must be reasonably fit for their intended use. See Mascuilli
v. United States, 241 F. Supp. 354, 363 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
153. During fiscal years 1963-1965, there were 1,605 groundings reported to the
Coast Guard. (Sources of statistics and reporting requirements are explained in note
39 supra.)
154. Webster, Is Radar an Aid to Safe Navigations, 20 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
MERCHANT MARINE COUNCIL

170 (1963).

155. President of India v. West Coast Steamship Co., 213 F. Supp. 352 (D.C. Ore.
1962), aff'd, 327 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964).
156. Id. at 357.
157. Id. at 358.
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Conclusion
Although radar is not a perfect anti-collision device, it is generally
recognized as a valuable aid to safe navigation. Improvements made
in the quality and performance of radar equipment, the training of radar
operators, and the development of new techniques and devices to be used
in conjunction with radar should enhance the effectiveness of radar as a
collision-prevention device even more in the future.
In light of the dependency of the shipping industry on the use of
radar as a bridge between the demands of commercial expediency and
safety, and the widespread use of radar in the shipping industry, the
courts should recognize the custom to carry radar as the correct standard
15
of conduct for vessels and should fault them for failing to carry radar.
However, special considerations may make the faulting of some smaller
vessels for failing to carry radar unwise.
No doubt the Rules will eventually be changed so as to recognize the
true value of radar to the shipping industry. Until the Rules are changed,
however, the courts should strive to compromise the present inconsistencies between the Rules and the practicality of the use of radar in the
shipping industry today.
158.

The following represent a few of the issues which might arise in the future:

a. Should minimum standards of quality and perforirance of radar equipment be established?
b. Should foreign vessels be faulted for failing to carry radar even though
the Rules do not require them to?
c. Should ocean-going vessels be required to carry a crew member trained
to make minor repairs? Major repairs?

